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Abstract
Climate policy needs to account for political and social acceptance. Current national climate policy
plans proposed under the Paris Agreement lead to higher emissions until 2030 than cost-effective
pathways towards the Agreements’ long-term temperature goals would imply. Therefore, the current
plans would require highly disruptive changes, prohibitive transition speeds, and large long-term
deployment of risky mitigation measures for achieving the agreement’s temperature goals after 2030.
Since the prospects of introducing the cost-effective policy instrument, a global comprehensive
carbon price in the near-term, are negligible, we study how a strengthening of existing plans by a
global roll-out of regional policies can ease the implementation challenge of reaching the Paris
temperature goals. The regional policies comprise a bundle of regulatory policies in energy supply,
transport, buildings, industry, and land use and moderate, regionally differentiated carbon pricing.
We find that a global roll-out of these policies could reduce global CO2 emissions by an additional
10GtCO2eq in 2030 compared to current plans. It would lead to emissions pathways close to the
levels of cost-effective likely below 2 ◦C scenarios until 2030, thereby reducing implementation
challenges post 2030. Even though a gradual phase-in of a portfolio of regulatory policies might be
less disruptive than immediate cost-effective carbon pricing, it would perform worse in other
dimensions. In particular, it leads to higher economic impacts that could become major obstacles in
the long-term. Hence, such policy packages should not be viewed as alternatives to carbon pricing,
but rather as complements that provide entry points to achieve the Paris climate goals.
Introduction
The Paris Agreement aims to collectively hold warming
to well below 2 ◦C and pursue efforts to limit warming
to 1.5 ◦C through progression of nationally determined
climate policy plans (called nationally determined
contributions, or NDCs). Nevertheless, countries have
already raised their concern that the current NDCs
would only slow the growth of global greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions and that short term ambition would
need tobe ratchetedup swiftly inorder tokeep the long-
term goals in reach (UNFCCC 2015). This concern
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by IOP Publishing Ltd
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was further supported by recent analyses (Rogelj et al
2016). Following an NDC trajectory until 2030 would
imply larger mitigation challenges in terms of the
need for even faster and deeper emissions reduc-
tions after 2030 in view of an increased carbon
lock-in compared to cost-effective well below 2 ◦C
scenarios (Riahi et al 2015, Fawcett et al 2015).
Ratcheting up NDCs requires identifying concrete
policies that could be effectively implemented in the
real world. Economic theory has frequently empha-
sized the importance of carbon pricing as the least-
cost policy to achieve emission reductions (Edenhofer
et al 2015). However, climate policy needs also to
be socially and politically acceptable while providing
credible long-term pathways for climate stabilization
(Vogt-Schilb and Hallegatte 2017). This requires to
take into account other societal objectives, such as
reducing local air pollution, in the policy choice.
Implementing a carbon price alone would entail clearly
visible costs that would immediately affect specific
actors such as energy-intensive industries. Such actors
might have the power to veto necessary policy reform
and undermine the political feasibility of carbon pric-
ing (Trebilcock 2014, Jenkins 2014). This may compel
governments to look for alternative mitigation policies
that may be politically more feasible but economically
more costly.
Despite their importance for policymakers, rigor-
ous analyses of politically feasible policies to strengthen
the NDCs to keep the Paris climate goals in reach is
limited (den Elzen et al 2015, Fekete et al 2015, IEA
2015), and in the context of the 1.5 ◦C limit practi-
cally absent. This study investigates how rolling out
a set of existing ‘good practice’ policies, as well as
additional policies aiming to achieve carbon neutral-
ity in individual sectors (‘net zero’ policies), would
strengthen emissions reductions until 2030 and serve as
entry points for achieving the Paris temperature goals.
The novel element is to integrate such detailed policy
packages until 2030 into pathways that reach long-
term targets until 2100 using an integrated assessment
modelling framework. This allows us to evaluate the
consistency of these policy packageswith the long-term
Paris ambition, including to what extent they keep the
door open for limiting warming to 1.5 ◦C (Rogelj et al
2015). Specifically, we assess how multiple dimensions
that influence medium- to long-term political feasibil-
ity (Gambhir et al 2017), including transition speed,
scale, and disruptiveness, are affected by the choice of
short-term policy package until 2030 and the availabil-
ity of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) measures.
Methods
We use a global multi-sector, multi-region integrated
assessment modelling (IAM) framework, REMIND-
MAgPIE (Popp et al 2014, Luderer et al 2015,
Kriegler et al 2017) to assess the extent to which the
strengthening ofNDCswith additional policy packages
would help keeping the Paris temperature goals within
reach. The IAM framework consists of the energy-
economy-climate model REMIND (Bauer et al 2008,
Leimbach et al 2010a, 2010b, Luderer et al 2013,
2015) coupled to the land-use model MAgPIE (Lotze-
Campen et al 2008, Popp et al 2010, 2014). Both
models cover the globe with 11 regions and run scenar-
ios until the year 2100. Further details of the modeling
framework can be found in the supplementary mate-
rial, section S3 available at stacks.iop.org/ERL/13/
074022/mmedia.
Scenario design: in this study, we compare 13
climate policy scenarios which all assume middle-of-
the road socio-economic developments as described
in Shared Socio-Economic Pathway 2 (SSP2) (Riahi
et al 2017). The scenarios are differentiated along the
three dimensions of near-term policy, long-term cli-
mate target and CDR availability (see table 1 for an
overview of the scenario set).
The scenario set considers four different cases of
near-term policy developments. The two benchmark
cases of moderate and high near-term ambition are
commonly used mitigation scenario designs (Fawcett
et al 2015). They comprise a scenario following the
conditional NDCs until 2030 and thereafter transition-
ing to global carbon pricing towards the Paris goals
(called ‘NDCs’ in the following), and a scenario with
a near-term phase-in (2020–2040) of cost-effective
global carbon pricing to reach the Paris goals with-
out pursuing additional policies as suggested in the
NDCs (‘Cost-effective pricing’). The cost-effective
pricing scenario shows greater emissions reductions
until 2030 due to the earlier adoption of global carbon
price levels in line with the Paris goals (supplemen-
tary material figure S2). Such scenarios have been
used as near-cost-optimal benchmark to evaluate the
emissions gap of the NDCs (UNEP 2016). The other
two near-term policy cases explored in this study
represent intermediate levels of near-term ambition.
These policy scenarios pursue ‘Good Practice’ and ‘Net
Zero’ policy packages, respectively, on top of the con-
ditional NDCs until 2030 and thereafter transition
to cost-effective global carbon pricing to reach the
Paris temperature goals. The formulation of the two
policy packages is motivated below.
The NDC scenarios as well as the Good Practice
and Net Zero scenarios assume that until 2030, all
countries follow their respective mitigation targets and
anticipate a continuation of national ambition level
afterwards, and only from 2035 onwards act with full
foresight towards the long-term target. Cost-effective
pricing scenarios already allow for anticipation of the
long-term climate target after 2020.
Weconsider twodifferent long-termclimate goals
in the scenario design. 2 ◦C targets are implemented
as a bound on cumulative total CO2 emissions from
2011–2100 of 1000GtCO2, implying a high likelihood
(>66%) of staying below 2 ◦C if non-CO2 GHGs are
2
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Table 1. Overview of the scenario set that is differentiated along the three dimensions of near-term policy (horizontal), as well as long-term
climate target and CDR availability. Please note that the three 1.5 ◦C scenarios with limited CDR and less than optimal short-term policies
cannot be solved within our modeling framework, as even with diverging high carbon prices the long-term budget is exceeded.
Near-term policy
Increasing near-term policy ambition→
Long-term climate
target ↓
CDR assumption
↓
NDCs until 2030 Good Practice Net Zero Cost-effective
carbon pricing
2 ◦C (1000 GtCO2
2011–2100)
Full availability NDC-2 ◦C GoodPractice-2 ◦C NetZero-2 ◦C Cost-effective-2 ◦C
Reduced availability NDC-2 ◦C-redCDR GoodPractice-2 ◦C-
redCDR
NetZero-2 ◦C-
redCDR
Cost-effective-
2 ◦C-redCDR
1.5 ◦C (400 GtCO2
2011–2100)
Full availability NDC-1.5 ◦C GoodPractice-1.5 ◦C NetZero-1.5 ◦C Cost-effective-1.5 ◦C
Reduced availability [n.a.] [n.a.] [n.a.] Cost-effectice-
1.5 ◦C-redCDR
mitigated in line with CO2 (Clarke et al 2014). 1.5
◦C
targets are implemented as a more stringent bound of
400GtCO2, implying a greater than 66% likelihood of
holding 2100 temperatures below 1.5 ◦C, but allow-
ing for temporary overshoot of this temperature limit
(Luderer et al 2018). Each of the two CO2 budget are
achieved by iteratively adjusting a global carbon price
that is assumed to growwith 5%p.a. until 2060 and lin-
early thereafter. Regionally fragmented carbonprices in
2020 (for the cost-effective scenarios) or 2030 (for the
other scenarios) converge to the globally harmonized
carbon price over a 20 year period (see figure S2 in the
supplementary material). GHGs other than CO2 are
priced equivalently to CO2 throughout the 21st cen-
tury based on 100 year global warming potentials from
IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report.
Since the large-scale deployment of CDR technolo-
gies in deep mitigation pathways has raised a number
of feasibility and sustainability concerns (Smith et al
2015), we calculated the scenarios for two different
assumptions on the availability of CDR technologies.
The fullCDRscenarios allow the full useof thepotential
of afforestation and BECCS as endogeneously emerg-
ing from the REMIND-MAgPIE model. In the limited
CDR scenarios, we limit the total amount of global
land area available for afforestation to 375 million ha,
the available purpose-grown biomass to 100 EJ yr−1,
and the maximum yearly CCS injection to 8GtCO2
(instead of 16GtCO2 in the full CDR cases).
Development of policy packages: the ‘good
practice’ and ‘net zero’ policy packages identified in
this study constitute a significant strengthening of the
policy ambition of the NDCs. An overview of the
two strengthened policy packages along with sector-
level benchmark values are presented in table 2. The
implementation of these strengthened policies is often
driven by multiple factors including social, economic,
competitiveness and development-related factors in
addition to climate policy considerations. Since many
of these policies include a broader set of priorities
thanGHG abatement, they supplement the typical car-
bon pricing policies in least-cost emission scenarios
(Bertram et al 2015, von Stechow et al 2015).
The ‘good practice’ policy package assumes a global
roll out of selected policies that are currently imple-
mented successfully in some countries (Fekete et al
2015, Roelfsema et al 2018). The development of a
good practice policy package for this study is an exten-
sion of (Fekete et al 2015, Roelfsema et al 2018), where
benchmarks were derived for each (sub-)sector from
countries that have implemented the best-in-class poli-
cies and that have resulted in significant deviation from
business-as-usual emission development. By design,
the good practice policy package can be regarded as
implementable at least in some parts of the world
because it is based on actions that some countries are
already undertaking. However, policy plans and targets
in some countries may not be immediately compatible
with the political environment in other countries. A
global roll-out of these policies would therefore need
to be nationally determined and adapted to national
circumstances. To this end, we assume some regional
variation in the roll-out of selected policies with poten-
tially high public costs (Inchauste and Victor 2017).
We here update and refine the ‘good practice’
benchmark values by examining existing policies
mainly for major emitting countries, e.g. China, the
EU, India, Japan and the U.S. First, existing policies
were identified per (sub-)sector based on Kuramochi
et al (2016) and CD-LINKS (2017), which conducted
surveys to in-country experts to identify important
policies for GHG emissions reductions including other
relevant policies that were not primarily motivated by
energy and climate policy goals. Other studies reviewed
include Healy et al (2016) and den Elzen et al (2015).
We then reviewed the literature on the impact of the
identified policies. We also examined five–ten year his-
torical trends of (sub-)sector-level energy and GHG
emission indicators because it is often difficult, or not
possible in some cases, to quantify net impact of poli-
cies. Based on this analysis, we selected policies that
are effective and at the same time replicable in differ-
ent parts of the world. The (sub-)sector benchmarks
that are assumed achievable under the selected poli-
cies were used as ‘good practice’ values. Where the
impact of key policies could not be directly quantified,
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Table 2. Overview of sector-level benchmarks under strengthened policy packages. The rationale for these benchmarks are explained in the
methods section as well in the supplementary online material. Corresponding values as resulting under the NDC and least cost well below
2 ◦C scenarios are shown as reference and can be compared to the numbers in paranthesis for good practice and Net-zero ranges are given for
benchmarks that are differentiated across regions, specifications are given in supplementary material, section S2.
Sector Current level
(global values in
2015 given if not
stated otherwise)
Good pracce value (in
2030 if not stated
otherwise)
Net-zero value toward
2030 (in 2030 if not
stated otherwise
Condional
NDC value
(moderate-
ambion
reference)
Value in well
below 2°C cost-
eﬀecve
scenario (high-
ambion
reference)
Energy supply:
renewables
share in power
generaon
0.45 %-point/yr
share increase
1.25–1.45 %-point/yr share
increase
same as good pracce 1.0%-point/yr
(2020–2030
average)
2.5%-point/yr
(2020–2030
average)
Energy supply:
fossil fuel-ﬁred
power
270 GW coal
power under
construcon
No new unabated coal
power plants aer 2023
(→123 GW coal 2020–2030
new installaons)
No new unabated coal
aer 2018 beyond units
under constr.; no new
unabated gas aer 2022–
2032 (→24 GW coal 2020–
2030)
278 GW of new
unabated coal
power (2020–
2030)
24 GW of new
unabated coal
power (2020–
2030)
Industry Approx. 1%/yr
energy eﬃciency
(EE)
improvement;
0.5%/yr addional EE
improvement (→9%
reducon of total ﬁnal
energy (FE) in 2030);
0.5%/yr addional EE
improvement (→9%
reducon in total FE in
2030);
5% reducon of
total FE rel. to
current policy in
2030;
14% reducon of
total FE rel. to
current policy in
2030
No full scale
commercial CCS
Approx. 200 MtCO2 /yr CCS
in industry.
Approx. 500 MtCO2 /yr CCS
in industry.
70 Mt CO2/yr
CCS in industry
200 Mt CO2/yr
CCS in industry
Buildings 1%/yr retroﬁt;
Approx.
1.5-2.1%/yr retroﬁt;
new buildings on average
near zero energy by 2020–
30;
3%/yr retroﬁt;
new buildings on average
near zero energy by 2020–
25; 6% reducon of
total FE rel. to
current policy in
2030
15% reducon of
total FE rel. to
current policy in
2030
1%/yr energy
eﬃciency (EE)
improvement
for appliances and
lighng
0.5%/yr addional EE for
appliances and lighng;
(→13% reducon of total
ﬁnal energy (FE))
0.5%/yr addional EE for
appliances and lighng;
lighng
(→20% reducon of total
FE)
Passenger
transport;
freight
transport;
internaonal
shipping and
aviaon
EV share in new
sales: <1%;
20–30% EV share in new
sales;
65–75% EV share in new
sales;
16% EV share; 33% EV share;
LDV fuel
economy: 20 km/l
(Japan, 2013, test
mode);
38 km/l for new LDVs;
strengthened new freight
vehicle fuel eﬃciency;
Fuel eﬃciency as good
pracce;
3% reducon of
total FE rel. to
current policy in
2030
9% reducon of
total FE rel. to
current policy in
20301.4%/yr increase
in bunker CO2
emissions
Aviaon EE improvement
up to 2%/yr by 2020, cap
emissions at a max of 2020
values for years >2020
(→13% reducon of total
ﬁnal energy (FE))
2.6%/yr aviaon EE
improvement and scale-up
of biofuels use
(→22% reducon of total
FE)
Agriculture Anaerobic
digester adopon:
10%;
30% adopon of anaerobic
digesters;
same as good pracce Anaerobic
digester
adopon:20%
Anaerobic
digester
adopon:20%
Nitrogen (N) use
eﬃciency:
52%
10%-point increase of N
use eﬃciency
same as good pracce N use
eﬃciency: 4%-
point increase
N use eﬃciency:
4%-point increase
Forestry and
land use
6 million ha/yr net
forest loss
End natural forest loss;
10 million ha/yr
aﬀorestaon
same as good pracce End of natural
forest loss in
some countries;
7 million ha/yr
aﬀorestaon
End of natural
forest loss in
2020; 4 million
ha/yr
aﬀorestaon
Carbon pricing Low to moderate
carbon pricing in a
few regions
at least 5$/t CO2 in 2025,
increase at 1$/year (higher
for countries with exisng
carbon pricing) (→average
price in 2030 at 22$)
at least 5$/tCO2 in 2025,
increase at 2$/year (higher
for countries with exisng
carbon pricing) (→average
price in 2030 at 27$)
Minimum price
of 1$ unl
2030, average
price at 13$
Carbon prices
between 47–50$/t
CO2 in 2030
we selected benchmarks based on techno-economic
potential studies from the literature.
The ‘net zero’ policy package is more ambitious
than the ‘good practice’ package, as it adds policies
pushing for zero emission technologies particularly
in energy end-use sectors in line with the Paris
Agreement’s goal to reach net zero CO2 emissions in
the second half of the century (Kriegler et al 2014,
Rogelj et al 2015). It assumes global roll out of ambi-
tious policy plans, strategies and targets that have been
announced in recent years as well as a range of techno-
economic studies on deep decarbonisation pathways,
and represents the level of ambition of at least some
of the actors. ‘Net zero’ benchmark values were set
only for selected (sub-)sectors that are most relevant
(Kuramochi et al 2018). The selection of (sub-)sector
‘net zero’ policieswas conducted in similar steps aswith
‘good practice’ policies.
The result (table 2) is an indication of the rate
of change that may be achievable with sector-specific
policies, many of which already successfully imple-
mented in some countries. This is different to the
technical mitigation potential that is shown in other
studies (UNEP 2017).
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REMIND-MAgPIE implementation of policy
packages: the conditional NDCs are represented in
REMIND-MAgPIE by a range of sector-level targets in
the energy- and land-use systems, plus regional emis-
sions targets on total GHG excluding land-use change
CO2 emissions where applicable (Roelfsema et al
2018). In regionswhere the sector targets by themselves
are not sufficient to meet the emissions constraint,
a region-specific residual carbon price to initiate the
required additional emissions reductions is imposed.
The Good Practice and Net Zero policy packages
also represent a range of sector-level targets, and addi-
tionally assume regionally differentiated carbon prices
that exceed those resulting from the NDC emission
constraints (figure S2 in the supplementary mate-
rial). We decompose the effect of strengthening carbon
pricing vs. strengthening sectoral policies in the sup-
plementary material (section S1.2). Both contribute
roughly equal to the strengthening of 2030 emissions
reductions in the Good Practive and Net Zero cases
compared to the conditional NDCs (figure S3 in the
supplementary material).
All sector-specific policies in the Good Practice
and Net Zero policy packages are implemented as
respective lower or upper bounds or additional equa-
tions, constraining the solution space of the model.
So instead of representing direct national policies (for
example feed-in tariffs for renewables), the desired
outcome of such policies is represented (increasing
renewable shares in power generation). This approach
does not yield direct insights into distributional impli-
cations of different policy instruments, or other
questions of policy design (e.g. whether or not feed-
in tariffs, auctions, or performance standards work
best for renewable support). Nevertheless, it leads to
a more detailed representation of the near-term trajec-
tories than amere variation of carbon prices as sectoral
mitigation shares are affected by the policy choice. In
particular, our approachcaptures towhat extent carbon
lock-in can be avoided in the different sectors and how
well upscaling of alternatives is prepared for by sup-
portingpolicies. These are key features for analysing the
benefits of strengthened near-term action for keeping
long-term targets within reach (Bertram et al 2015).
It is important to note that efficiency targets in the
buildings, transport and industry sectors are imple-
mented by setting a maximum on total final energy
use in the respective sectors. This forces the model
solution away from the equilibrium energy use of the
production function, leading to rather high GDP and
consumption losses. These are most likely overesti-
mated, given that some of the efficiency policies will, at
least in the medium- to longer term, also have an effect
on the autonomous energy efficiency improvement in
these sectors which is not represented in the model.
Further information on the selection of policies as
well as the translation of their impact into REMIND-
MAgPIE calculations can be found in section S2 of the
supplementary material.
Implementability assessment: the ability to imple-
ment climate polices can be affected by a range of
factors which we group in five dimensions: the speed
and the scale of the transition such policies aim to
induce, the disruption they cause to existing trends and
patterns, their economic efficiency, and their distribu-
tional impacts on socio-economic actors. For the first
four dimension we identify a small set of indicators
that serve as proxies for key implementation challenges
and at the same time can bemeaningfully implemented
in the REMIND-MAgPIEmodel. The fifth dimension,
distributional impacts, is a critical factor for assessing
the political feasibility of implementing climate pol-
icy measures. The ability of evaluating distributional
impacts ofmitigationpathwaysderived fromintegrated
assessment models is still limited, and an active area
of research (see Bauer et al (2016), for an example).
Here we look at a more narrow category, price changes
for basic household goods, that are often drivers of
distributional impacts.
Changes occurring at unprecedented pace (cate-
gory ‘speed’) might entail large adjustment costs or
simply overwhelm the capabilities of societies as well as
legal and institutional frameworks to adapt. Anobvious
high-level indicator for transition speed in the energy
sector is annual average emissions reduction rates from
fossil fuel combustion. But, also the land use sector
may face rapidly increasing demand for bioenergy and
afforestation in deep mitigation scenarios.
It may be difficult to undertake large-scale changes
without new strains on society and the environment
(category ‘scale’). Deployment of CCS has repeatedly
been faced with public resistance even in the case of
small-scale pilot projects. A wide variety of technically
feasible CDR technologies, but also other decarboniza-
tion technologies could face similar resistance. The
political acceptability of overshoot pathways relying on
net negative emissions is particularly questionable in
this respect. In addition, using large areas of land for
afforestation or bioenergy production can be limited by
sustainability concerns, such as biodiversity.
Costs that arise for concentrated interest groups,
such as owners of fossil fuel reserves, coal-fired power
plants, or energy intensive industries, as a result of
disruptive changes in the energy system and other
GHG-emitting sectors can make it politically difficult
to trigger the necessary changes (Inchauste and Vic-
tor 2017) (category ‘disruption’). A high-level indicator
for disruptive changes is the change in CO2 emissions
growth rate from one decade to the next. In addition,
we consider idle capacities of coal-fired power plants as
a disruption indicator.
In terms of ‘efficiency’, we consider the overall
macro-economic costs ofmitigation policies as implied
by the discounted stream of losses in household con-
sumption. These are only direct economic costs that do
not include economic benefits and co-benefits of mit-
igation policies from avoided damages due to reduced
warming.
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Table 3. Overview of implementability indicators. The indicator selection is discussed in the methods section and detailed definitions are provided in section 1.3 in the supplementary material. Maxima of decadal averages are taken over
the period 2020–2050 (first six indicators). Please note that a visual representation of this data that more clearly shows the relative relationships is offered in figure 3.
Indicator
Disruption Speed Price Impacts Efficiency Scale
CO2 trend
break
Idle coal CO2
reduction
Landbio+aff
inc
CO2 price
increase
Foodprice
increase
ConsLoss Cum CCS Cum neg CO2 Land bio+aff
Unit
Maximum
change in
gross CO2
emissions
reduction
rate between
decades [pp]
Maximum
idle capacity
of coal power
plants in a
given year
[GW]
Maximum
annual
average
emissions
reduction
rate per
decade
[%/yr]
Maximum
annual
average
increase of
land for affor.
and bioen.
crops
[mha/yr]
Maximum
annual
average
increase of
carbon price
per decade
[$/tCO2/yr]
Maximum
annual
average
increase of
food price
index per
decade
[%/yr]
Cumulated
discounted
consumption
loss expressed
in % of
cumulated
baseline
consumption
Cumulative
CCS
deployment
over 21st
century
(GtCO2)
Cumulative
net negative
emissions
over 21st
century
(GtCO2)
Global area
for affor. and
bioenergy
crops (in
2050) [mha]
Implementation
challenge
Employment,
costs for
concentrated
interest
groups
Employment,
costs for
concentrated
interest
groups
Adjustment
costs,
adoption of
legal and
institutional
frameworks
Adoption of
legal and
institutional
frameworks
Costs for
concentrated
interest
groups as
well as the
broad public
Food security Overallmitigation costs
Public
attitudes, risk
perception
Public
attitudes, risk
perception,
finance
Additional
sustainability
concerns
(e.g.
biodiversity)
NDCs
2
°
C
 
F
u
l
l
 
C
D
R 3.4 985 4.3 25 9.1 3.1 1.9 722 393 557
Good Practice 2.5 820 3.8 23 7.6 2.7 1.9 719 312 533
Net Zero 3.3 812 3.3 20 6.7 2.3 2.1 718 251 504
Cost-effective 3.8 976 2.9 18 4.6 2.5 1.8 691 207 437
NDCs
1
.
5
°
C
 
F
u
l
l
 
C
D
R 4.6 985 5.6 43 20.0 6.1 3.4 878 825 909
Good Practice 3.2 820 5.1 38 17.3 5.3 3.2 864 745 839
Net Zero 3.3 814 4.6 34 15.0 4.9 3.3 861 698 775
Cost-effective 4.7 1051 4.0 23 8.2 3.8 3.0 826 557 661
Scenarios with reduced CDR availability
NDCs
2
°
C
 
R
e
d
 
C
D
R 4.9 985 5.8 31 31.2 6.9 3.6 457 224 546
Good Practice 3.5 821 5.3 25 24.0 5.8 3.3 451 155 536
NetZero 3.3 814 4.6 24 19.8 5.6 3.2 457 117 525
Cost-effective 4.6 1051 3.8 22 8.4 3.8 2.6 454 20 506
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Finally, concerns about who bears the costs of
emission reductions and how quickly affected actors
may be able to adapt to price increases determine
whether mitigation polices are seen as equitable, which
can be expected to influence their implementability
(category ‘price impacts’). For instance, rising food
prices resulting from competition for arable land for
biomass and food production could endanger food
security. Energy price inceases predominantly affect
low income household. We use the decadal increase
in carbon prices as proxy for the price impact of climate
policies. The exact definitions of the implementability
indicators are described in the supplementary material.
Results
Global warming can be limited to likely below 2 ◦C
throughout the 21st century in all four policy sce-
narios with both full and reduced CDR availability.
Limiting warming to 1.5 ◦C by 2100 can also be
achieved in all four policy scenarios by our modeling
framework if CDR is fully available. However, when
restricting CDR, 1.5 ◦C pathways could only be identi-
fied for the cost-effective pricing scenario introducing
comprehensive carbon pricing directly after 2020.
Mid-century global carbon prices are about twice as
high in 1.5 ◦C pathways than in well below 2 ◦C path-
ways with full CDR (table S1 in the supplementary
material). For both temperature goals, strengthening
near term ambition from ‘NDCs’ to ‘Net Zero’ can
reduce mid-century carbon prices by around 30%
to levels comparable to those found in the cost-
effective scenarios. Restricted CDR availability rewards
the strengthening of near term action more strongly
and pushes 1.5 ◦C to the limit of what can be reached
even with comprehensive carbon pricing after 2020
(Luderer et al 2013, Strefler et al 2018).
Impact on emissions: the ‘good practice’ and ‘net
zero’ policy scenarios provide significant additional
emissions reductions in 2030 compared to the NDC
scenario (figures 1 and S1). We project the NDCs
to reach 43GtCO2 and 57GtCO2equivalent emissions
(including non-CO2 GHGs) in 2030 within the range
of literature estimates (Fawcett et al 2015, Rogelj et al
2016, 2017, den Elzen et al 2016, UNEP 2017, Ben-
veniste et al 2018). The additional emissions reductions
of ca. 8 GtCO2 / 10GtCO2eq in 2030 in the ‘net
zero’scenario (figure S3 in the supplementary mate-
rial) close a large part of the emissions gap to the
cost-effective scenarios in this study and the bench-
mark value of 40GtCO2eq emissions stated in the Paris
Decision (UNFCCC 2015) and based on the IPCC’s
Fifth Assessment Report (Edenhofer et al 2014). This
is achieved with a very different policy mix than in
the cost-effective carbon pricing scenarios.The mix is
characterized by a substantial strengthening of tech-
nology and efficiency policies while regional carbon
pricing is only moderately strengthened compared to
the NDC scenario (see figure S2 in the supplemen-
tary material for regional carbon price levels in the
four policy scenarios). Strengthened regulation and
strengthened carbon pricing contribute roughly equal
to the additional emissions reductions in 2030 (sec-
tion S1.2 in the supplementary material and figure
S3). In the cost-effective pricing scenarios, emis-
sion levels fall to 30GtCO2 / 41GtCO2eq in 2030
for the likely below 2 ◦C with full CDR availabil-
ity, 26GtCO2 / 37GtCO2eq for both the likely below
2 ◦C with restricted CDR and 1.5 ◦C with full CDR,
and 15GtCO2 / 25GtCO2eq for 1.5
◦C with restricted
CDR.One of the lowest emission pathways put forward
in the literature to date reach levels of 20 Gt of CO2
emissions in 2030 (Rockstro¨m et al 2017), in between
what we obtain for the cost-effective 1.5 ◦C pathways
with full vs. restricted CDR as well as in between the
cost-effective 1.5 ◦C vs. 2 ◦C pathways with restricted
CDR.
The ‘Good practice’ and ‘Net Zero’ policy sce-
narios mitigate the trend break in the NDC scenario
between the periods 2020–2030 and 2030–2050 (fig-
ure 1, lower panel). This is also true for economic
quantities like electricity sector investments (figure
2). A more steady increase in low carbon electricity
investments over the next decades enhances the imple-
mentability of the electricity sector transformation
compared to more rapid redirectioning of invest-
ments around 2020 (in the case of the cost-effective
scenarios) or 2030 (in the case of the NDC scenario).
Implementability of pathways:we assess the polit-
ical implementability of the mitigation scenarios with
the indicators introduced above relating to speed,
scale, efficiency, price impacts, and disruptiveness of the
transition (table 2 and figure 3). They display clear
trends across the four policy scenarios. The NDC sce-
nario performs worst in almost all implementability
dimensions, confirming earlier findings that a delay of
mitigation action until 2030 implies disruptive changes
in 2030, very large transition speeds after 2030 and
substantial CDR deployment in the second half of
the century to limit warming to 1.5 ◦C–2 ◦C by the
end of the century (Kriegler et al 2013, Luderer et al
2013, Riahi et al 2015, Fawcett et al 2015, Strefler et al
2018). In contrast, the cost-effective pricing scenario
performs best in most dimensions, with the notable
exception of disruptiveness. Here it performs similar
or even worse than the NDC scenario due to a rapid
increase in carbon prices during the period 2020–2030.
The ‘Good practice’ and ‘Net zero’ scenarios are
less disruptive than both the ‘NDC’ (in 2030) and
‘Cost effective’ scenarios (see also the example of
annual changes in investments in renewable power
technologies, supplementary material section S.1.3.2).
This points to their ability to smooth transitional
breaks and serve as entry points to ratcheting up
climate policy plans. However, they score less favor-
able than cost-effective pricing in other dimensions.
While ‘Good practice’ and in particular ‘Net zero’ can
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Figure 1. The upper panel shows global net CO2 emissions trajectories towards the well below 2
◦C target with full (left) and limited
CDR availability (center) and towards the 1.5 ◦C target with full CDR availability (right). The lower panel highlights the associated
annual net CO2 emissions growth rates for the periods 2020–2030 and 2030–2050 and the change in growth rates between the two
periods and the reference period 2005–2015. Please note that the right side of the upper panel additionally includes the emission
trajectory of theCost-effective-1.5 ◦C-redCDRscenario in light blue, in the samegraph as the1.5 ◦Cscenarioswith fullCDRavailability.
mitigate the impact of delay on transition speeds com-
pared to the ‘NDC’ scenario, they still require higher
maximum decadal emissions reduction rates in the
energy sector, faster expansion of land for afforesta-
tion and bioenergy crops, and higher CO2 prices
increases than the cost-effective scenarios. This finding
holds also for the annual increase in renewable power
deployment (supplementary material, section S.1.3.2).
A less pronounced picture emerges for the scale
indicators. While cumulative CCS use is virtually
unchanged across the four policy scenarios, landuse for
bioenergy andafforestationand inparticular the cumu-
lative amount of net negative emissions, and thus the
degree of temperature overshoot, varies from ‘NDC’
(highest) to ‘Cost effective’ (lowest). However, ‘Net
Zero’ performs almost equally well than ‘cost-effective’
scenarios for likely below 2 ◦C, only for 1.5 ◦C does it
lead to higher net negative emissions and land use.
The ‘Good practice’ and ‘Net zero’ scenarios also
mitigate the price impacts compared to the NDC sce-
nario, even though maximum food and carbon price
increases in a single decade are still higher than in
the cost-effective scenario. Notably, the two regulatory
policy scenarios have similar or—in the case of 2 ◦C
with full CDR—even higher macro-economic costs
than the NDC scenario. This highlights the fact that
regulatory policies can lead to lower distributional chal-
lenges associated with direct price impacts even though
they incur higher macro-economic costs (Bertram
et al 2015).
These rankings are robust across the three cases
of the likely below 2 ◦C limit with full and restricted
CDR availability and the 1.5 ◦C limit with full CDR
availabilty. In general, restricting CDR availability
limits—by definition—cumulative CCS and net nega-
tive emissions (scale), but increases the magnitude of
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Figure 2. Annual average investments for the periods 2020–2030 and 2030–2050 in low carbon power technologies (upper part;
including renewable and nuclear power and fossil fuel power plants with CCS) and unabated fossil fuel power plants (lower part) as
well as changes in investment levels between the two periods and between 2015 and 2020–2030.
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the transition speed and disruptiveness indicators, in
the cases of food and carbon prices by more than a
factor of two. The food price result is counterintu-
itive and due to the fact that continued strong demand
for biofuels keeps land demand at similar levels as for
unrestricted CDR, while higher emissions prices
impose an additional penalty on agricultural produc-
tion (Stevanovic´ et al 2017).
Implementation challenges of 1.5 ◦C pathways are
larger than for likely below 2 ◦C pathways in all
dimensions, particularly concerning scale (50%–60%
more land demand for BECCS and afforestation and
110%–180% more net negative emissions) and speed
(30%–70% higher maximum increase in land demand
per decade for BECCS and afforestation and 30%–40%
higher maximum emissions reduction rate). Generally,
we find the differences in implementation challenges
between 1.5 ◦C–2 ◦C to be larger than the effect of
different near-term policy stringency. The benefit of
strengthening early action with the ‘good practice’ and
‘net zero’ policy packages increases for restricted vs.
full CDR availability and for 1.5 ◦C vs. likely below
2 ◦C particularly with regard to rapid trend breaks in
CO2 emissions (disruptiveness).
Discussion and conclusions
We find that the ‘Good practice’ and ‘Net Zero’ pol-
icy packages to strengthen the NDCs could provide
a bridge towards achieving the ambition of the Paris
Agreement. Although economy wide carbon pricing
would be the economically most efficient policy to
achieve emission reductions, it could be politically dif-
ficult to implement in the short term, for instance
due to stranded assets and job losses in some sec-
tors resulting from a strong increase of carbon prices.
The policy packages consisting of a range of mea-
sures and sector targets may be favoured because of
less direct visibility of mitigation costs as well as policy
makers’ experience with or ideological preference for
non-market policies (Drews and Bergh 2016). Com-
binations of different policies and sector targets, such
as the packages described above, could hence facili-
tate the implementation of the Paris Agreement. They
would lead to fewer disruptive changes with less distri-
butional implications, slower transition speeds, lower
land demand and lower overshoot than following the
NDCs until 2030. Without such near term strength-
ening of the NDCs, the temperature goals of the Paris
Agreement may be no longer in reach in 2030. The pol-
icy packages might also serve to achieve a broader set
of sustainable development objectives that are central
for real-world policy-making (Jakob and Steckel 2016,
von Stechow et al 2016).
However, with increasing ambitions the lower
economic efficiency of such policy packages can be
expected to aggravate the trade-offs between economic
efficiency and political feasibility and become a major
obstacle for the implementation of climate policies.
This trade-off can be reduced if successful short-term
policies result in ambitious long-term carbon pric-
ing schemes. Hence, they should be regarded as entry
points andcomplements tocarbonpricing,not as viable
alternatives in the long-term.
The study presented here is only a first step in con-
necting the analysis of mitigation pathways towards
the Paris climate goals with an assessment of the
implementability of near tomedium term (2020–2050)
climate action thatwould be consistentwith these path-
ways. More research will be needed to better describe
distributional impacts in mitigation pathways and to
consolidate a set of meaningful implementability indi-
cators for evaluating the scope of climate policies to
initiate deep emissions reductions. A strengthening of
current climate policy plans will be needed to keep
the door open for reaching the Paris climate goals.
Thus, the identification of climate policy portfolios that
can serve as entry points to deep mitigation pathways
is critical. Here we have shown that ambitious reg-
ulatory policy packages in combination with initially
moderate, but increasingly ambitious carbon pricing
could be a candidate for such entry points. Much
will depend on the extent to which the climate pol-
icy portfolios can be tailored to address a broader
set of sustainable development goals beyond limiting
future climate change.
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